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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Domingo Jesus-Martinez Diaz appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery 
with the intent to commit rape, and assault with the intent to commit rape. In his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Diaz asserted that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion to sever, erred when it allowed the State to present Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) evidence as outlined in its Rule 404(b) notice, and abused its 
discretion when it imposed his sentences. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Diaz did not show that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion, erred in its Rule 404(b) ruling, 
or abused its sentencing discretion. (Resp. Br., pp.6-28.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that the district 
court did not need to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis on the motion to sever. ( See 
Resp. Br., p.9.) Contrary to the State's contention, consideration of Rule 404(b) was 
necessary in this case, because, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the 
determination of whether the third potential source of prejudice 1 appears in a case 
essentially involves a Rule 404(b) analysis. See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868 
( 1983). This Reply Brief is also necessary to clarify that, contrary to the State's 
argument, Mr. Diaz's assertion that the evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b) 
to prove identity, because identity was not at issue, is preserved for appeal. 
1 Idaho's appellate courts have identified three potential sources of prejudice which may 
justify the grant of a motion to sever, and the third source is where "the jury may 
conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other 
because of his criminal disposition." See, e.g., Abel, 104 Idaho at 867-68. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Diaz's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Diaz's Motion to 
Sever, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted 
from the joint trial and denied him a fair trial? 
2. Did the district court err when it allowed the State to present Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) evidence, because the proffered evidence was not relevant to 
any applicable exception under the rule? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with ten years fixed, upon Mr. Diaz following his conviction for 
battery with the intent to commit rape, and a consecutive sentence of fifteen 
years indeterminate upon him following his conviction for assault with the intent 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Diaz's Motion To Sever 
Because The Facts Of His Trial Demonstrate That Unfair Prejudice Resulted From The 
Joint Trial And Denied Him A Fair Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to sever, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair prejudice resulted 
from the joint trial and denied him a fair trial. At Mr. Diaz's trial, the third potential 
source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may conclude that he was guilty of one 
crime and then find him guilty of the other simply because of his criminal disposition, 
i.e., Mr. Diaz is a bad person-appeared. See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867-869 
(1983). That potential source of prejudice appeared because evidence of either incident 
here would not have been admissible in a separate trial of the other, as it was not 
relevant to show identity, common scheme or plan, absence of mistake or accident, or 
intent. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868; I.R.E. 404(b ). 
When considering the third potential source of prejudice, the Idaho Supreme 
Court, like courts in some other jurisdictions, has "engaged in an analysis of the 
evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts had been tried 
separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence in the different 
trials." Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. This essentially involves an Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) analysis. See id. at 869. 
The State acknowledges that the district court did not conduct a Rule 404(b) 
analysis of Mr. Diaz's motion to sever pursuant to Abel, but argues that the district court 
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was not required to do so. {Resp. Br., p.9.) According to the State, "That such an 
analysis is 'useful,' and even dispositive in some cases, does not mean it is required." 
(Resp. Br., p.8 (quoting Abel, 104 Idaho at 865).) However, consideration of Rule 
404(b) was necessary in this case, because upon review of a denial of a motion to 
sever, the determination of whether the third potential source of prejudice appeared in a 
case such as Mr. Diaz's essentially involves a Rule 404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 
Idaho at 869. 
The State argues that "since Abel, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that 
'whether evidence would have been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in 
determining whether a proper joinder is prejudicial."' (Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (quoting State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 n.2 (2007)).) But the Field Court was reviewing the propriety 
of an initial joinder, which comes under a different standard than a motion to sever. See 
Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65. "Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to 
I.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. at 564. 
"In contrast, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a 
motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was proper 
in the first place." Id. at 564-65. Thus, joinder could be proper under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 8, but nonetheless prejudicial under Idaho Criminal Rule 14. See id. 
The Field Court was "reviewing the propriety of the initial joinder," and therefore 
exercised free review. Id. at 565. The State argued that joinder was proper because 
the testimony from one alleged victim would have been admissible in the case of the 
other alleged victim. See id. at 565 n.2. Thus, the Court's recognition that "whether 
evidence would have been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining 
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whether a proper joinder is prejudicial," was in the context of determining whether the 
initial joinder was proper, not whether the proper joinder was nonetheless prejudicial. 
See id. As explained above, those two different questions come under different 
standards of review. See id. at 564-65. The Idaho Supreme Court in Field did not 
depart from the Abel analysis for determining, upon review of a denial of a motion to 
sever, whether the third potential source of prejudice appeared. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals cases invoked by the State also do not help its 
argument that the district court did not need to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis of 
Mr. Diaz's motion to sever pursuant to Abel. The State cites State v. Tankovich, 155 
Idaho 221 (Ct. App. 2013) (Resp. Br., p.8), but Tankovich is inapposite because the 
potential source of prejudice at issue there was the first source, not the third source. 
The defendant in Tankovich was charged with malicious harassment and conspiracy to 
commit malicious harassment, and sought to sever his trial from the trial of two co-
conspirators. Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 224. The co-conspirators, but not the defendant, 
had tattoos displaying symbols typically associated with white supremacist groups. Id. 
at 224,226. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Tankovich noted that the defendant's claim of 
unfair prejudice in support of his motion to sever "mirrors his argument regarding the 
admissibility of the evidence of [the co-conspirators'] tattoos." Id. at 227. The 
defendant asserted "that evidence of one co-conspirator's intent is not relevant to a 
charge of conspiracy against another co-conspirator." Id. at 225. He also asserted "that 
the tattoo evidence was unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury, and therefore 
inadmissible under I.R.E. 403 because he did not have any similar tattoos." Id. at 226. 
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Thus, by raising an issue of jury confusion, the defendant in Tankovich brought his 
motion to sever under the first potential source of prejudice, i.e., "the possibility that the 
jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly 
segregated." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. 
The Tankovich Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it denied the motion to sever based on the first source, because "the evidence was 
admissible against [the defendant], and he was not unfairly prejudiced by its 
introduction." Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 227. Tellingly, the Court also observed that the 
defendant "has not asserted that the joinder of his trial resulted in any other form of 
prejudice." Id. Thus, Tankovich does not support the State's argument that a Rule 
404(b) analysis is not required when addressing the third potential source of prejudice, 
because that case did not deal with the third source. 
Nor does State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903 (Ct App. 2013), also quoted by the 
State (Resp. Br., pp.8-11 ), support the State's argument. The Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Eguilior clarified that the defendant brought her motion to sever under the third potential 
source of prejudice. Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908. The State argues that the Egui/ior 
Court "discussed the cross-admissibility of some evidence, [but] it did not conduct a 
404(b) analysis." (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, the Eguilior Court actually held that, 
"Even if the fourth case had been tried separately, evidence and information on the 
marijuana delivery counts likely would have gone before the jury because of its close 
relationship with the marijuana counts in the fourth case." Egui/ior, 137 Idaho at 908. 
Thus, the Court suggested that it properly addressed the third source, by "engag[ing] in 
an analysis of the evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts 
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had been tried separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence 
in the different trials." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. 
Further, in one of the cases cited by the Eguilior Court in reviewing the denial of 
a motion to sever, 137 Idaho at 908, the Idaho Court of Appeals expressly employed a 
Rule 404(b) analysis when it addressed the third source. State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 732 
(Ct. App. 1989). In Cirelli, the defendant filed a motion to sever a grand theft count for 
removal of property from a storage unit from two counts of grand theft by possession of 
property stolen in other burglaries. Cirelli, 115 Idaho at 733. The defendant argued the 
third source supported his motion to sever; namely, that "he was unduly prejudiced by 
joinder because of the risk that the jury might have reached a guilty verdict based solely 
on the evidence of [the defendant's) wrongdoing." Id. The Court stated that, "When 
considering the potential prejudice under such situations, we will determine whether, if 
the counts had been tried separately, the separate evidence of each count could have 
been admitted as evidence in the separate trial of each count." Id. (citing Abel, 104 
Idaho 865). 
The Cirelli Court then examined the evidence under Rule 404(b ): 
Through his defense, [the defendant] directly placed his intent with regard 
to the stolen property in issue. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is admissible to prove intent or absence of mistake. I.R.E. 404(b). 
Evidence of the quantity of stolen property found in [the defendant's] 
possession, and evidence of [the defendant's] apparent use of the 
property, would tend to show a lack of mistake as to [the defendant's] 
knowledge of the property and would tend to show [the defendant] 
possessed the property with the intent to deprive the owners of its use. 
Consequently, we hold that no unfair prejudice resulted on this ground. 
Id. Thus, the Court in Cirelli employed a Rule 404(b) analysis when it determined 
whether the third potential source of prejudice had appeared. See id. 
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Similarly, in State v. Gooding, 110 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 1986), another case cited 
in Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908, the defendant filed a motion to sever one count of lewd 
conduct from two other counts of lewd conduct involving a different victim. Gooding, 
110 Idaho at 857. The Idaho Court of Appeals, "Applying the approach in Abel," 
addressed all three potential sources of prejudice. Id. at 859. Regarding the third 
source, the Gooding Court concluded "that the clarity of the evidence of similarity of 
conduct involving the charged offenses weighs against the likelihood (the defendant] 
was found guilty of any count simply on the basis of criminal disposition." Id. 
Thus, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the determination of whether 
the third potential source of prejudice appeared in a case essentiaily involves a Rule 
404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 869. The State's argument to the contrary is 
unavailing. Because Mr. Diaz raised the third source in his motion to sever (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.6-17), consideration of Rule 404(b) was necessary in this case. 
Because the State's remaining arguments regarding the motion to sever are not 
remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Diaz simply refers the Court 
to pages 9-17 of the Appellant's Brief. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State To Present Idaho Rule Of Evidence 
404(b) Evidence 1 Because The Proffered Evidence Was Not Relevant To Any 
Applicable Exception Under The Rule 
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the State to present 
Rule 404(b) evidence as outlined in the State's Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b), 
because the proffered evidence was not relevant to any applicable exception under 
Rule 404(b ). 
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The State argues that Mr. Diaz did not preserve for appeal his assertion that the 
evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b) with respect to identity, because "he did 
not argue at the time of the district court's ruling [on the State's Rule 404(b) notice] that 
the evidence was not admissible to establish identity because counsel planned to 
concede identity in his opening statement." (Resp. Br., p.15.) As recognized by the 
State (Resp. Br., p.15), appellate courts generally will not consider arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal. E.g., State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715 {2009). 
However, Mr. Diaz's assertion that the evidence was not admissible to prove 
identity because identity was not at issue is preserved for appeal, because Mr. Diaz 
never placed identity at issue in this case. At the hearing on the motion to sever, 
Mr. Diaz asserted, "This is not a case where identity is an issue." (Tr., p.14, L.10.) 
"There is video of the suspect. Both alleged victims have made identifications from 
photo line-ups. There were extensive interviews conducted with my client during which 
he made several statements or admissions even that could be used against him." 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16.) Additionally, at the Rule 404(b) notice hearing, Mr. Diaz asserted, 
"We stand by our objection to the joinder." (Tr., p.31, Ls.5-6.) Thus, Mr. Diaz never 
placed identity at issue in this case. The assertion that the evidence was not admissible 
to prove identity because identity was not at issue is preserved for appeal. 
Cf. Severson, 147 Idaho at 715, 718 (reviewing an objection not raised at trial for 
fundamental error). 
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Because the State's remaining arguments regarding the State's Rule 404(b) 
notice are not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Diaz simply 
refers the Court to pages 9-18 of the Appellant's Brief.2 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Twenty Years, \Nith Ten Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Diaz Following His Conviction For 
Battery With The Intent To Commit Rape, And A Consecutive Sentence Of Fifteen 
Years Indeterminate Upon Him Following His Conviction For Assault With The Intent To 
Commit Rape 
Mr. Diaz asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
unified sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed, for battery with the intent to 
commit rape, and his consecutive sentence of fifteen years indeterminate for assault 
with the intent to commit rape, because the sentences are excessive considering any 
view of the facts. Because the State's argument concerning the sentencing issue is not 
remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Diaz refers the Court to 
pages 19-22 of the Appellant's Brief. 
2 Mr. Diaz's discussion of why the evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b) is in 
Section I of the Argument in the Appellant's Brief (see App. Br., pp.9-17), and 
incorporated by reference in Section II (see App. Br., pp.17-18). The State's discussion 
of the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 404(b) is in Section II of the Argument in 
the Respondent's Brief. (See Resp. Br., pp. 9 n.2 &12-23.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons presented in the Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand his case to the district court with instruction that his charges be severed to 
proceed in separate trials. Alternatively, Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial at which 
the proffered evidence as outlined in the State's Rule 404(b) notice may not be used to 
prove identity, common scheme or plan, or intent. Alternatively, Mr. Diaz respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2015. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY v 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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